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INTRODUCTION 
Market efficiency has been widely studied in the field of 
finance for decades, as it provides an investor with a sense of 
how well the price signal works at conveying all available 
information, and thus informs an investor of the necessity to 
acquire additional information about the firm issuing the 
security.1  Market efficiency has gained acceptance within the 
 
 *  The authors sincerely appreciate the detailed comments provided by 
Reena Aggarwal, Glenn Davis, John Davis, S.P. Kothari, Robert MacLaverty, 
Leslie Marx, Michael McDonald, David Nelson, Rebecca Nelson, Edward O’Brien, 
Jeffrey Pontiff, Terence Rodgers, Stephen Rovak, Hersh Shefrin, Erik Sirri, 
Dennis Staats, Robert Thompson, Paul Wazzan, and Simon Wheatley.  The 
authors, of course, take full responsibility for all opinions and errors.  The 
organizations with which the authors and reviewers are affiliated do not 
necessarily endorse or share the opinions or conclusions of this paper. 
 1. For some of the myriad academic research on market efficiency and its 
tests, see, e.g., Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Bradford Cornell, Spot Rates, Forward 
Rates and Exchange Market Efficiency, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 55 (1977); Michael 
Brennan & Eduardo Schwartz, An Equilibrium Model of Bond Pricing and a Test 
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court system as a means of facilitating proof in securities fraud 
litigation.  In particular, in the 1988 case of Basic v. Levinson, 
the United States Supreme Court firmly established the fraud-
on-the-market theory as a means for securities fraud plaintiffs 
to satisfy the legal element that they had relied upon a 
material misrepresentation or omission in purchasing or 
selling a security.  While the courts have recently reexamined 
whether the legal sector’s use of the efficient market theory is 
justified, it remains firmly entrenched in judicial analysis.  
Thus detailed economic analysis of market efficiency will 
continue to play a significant role in securities cases. 
Because reliance is a required element of securities fraud 
cases and because class action procedures generally require 
that plaintiffs show that reliance can be proven on a class-wide 
basis, courts most frequently assess market efficiency at the 
class certification stage of securities fraud cases—the point at 
which the court determines if the plaintiffs’ claims are best 
tried individually or whether numerous plaintiffs can 
collectively pursue essentially the same claim against the 
defendant at the same time.2  Trial courts thus devote 
significant time and energy to determinations about market 
efficiency in deciding whether to certify a case for class action 
treatment. 
In Cammer v. Bloom (D. N.J. 1989), the federal district 
court enumerated several factors for determining market 
efficiency of the securities in question: (1) the average weekly 
trading volume, (2) the number of security analysts following 
and reporting on the security, (3) the extent to which market 
 
of Market Efficiency, 17 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 301 (1982); Gerald 
Dwyer & Myles Wallace, Cointegration and Market Efficiency, 11 J. INT’L MONEY 
& FIN. 318 (1992); Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 100 VA L. REV. 313 (1984); Michael Jensen, Some Anomalous 
Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95 (1978); S.P. Kothari, 
Capital Markets Research in Accounting, 31 J. ECON. &  ACCT. 105 (2001); Tim 
Loughran & Jay Ritter, Uniformly Least Powerful Tests of Market Efficiency, 55 
J. FIN. ECON. 361 (2000); “Efficient Market Hypothesis.” NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 739–42 (1st ed. 1992); Burton Malkiel, The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERP. 59 (2003); Rafael 
Porta, Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny, Good News for Value 
Stocks: Further Evidence on Market Efficiency, 52 J. FIN. 859 (1997); Richard Roll, 
A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market, 
39 J. FIN. 1127 (1984); Paul Samuelson, An Enjoyable Life Puzzling Over Modern 
Finance Theory, 1 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON.. 19 (2009); Robert Shiller, The Use of 
Volatility Measures in Assessing Market Efficiency, 36 J. FIN. 291 (1981). 
 2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Halliburton Co. v. Erica Pl John Fund, Inc., ___ 
U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407–08, 2412, 2415–16 (2014). 
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makers traded the security, (4) the issuer’s eligibility to file an 
SEC registration Form S-3, and (5) the cause-and-effect 
relationship between material disclosures and changes in the 
security’s price.3  These “Cammer factors” have been adopted 
by a number of courts, while still other courts have added other 
factors.4  For instance, one court considered the company’s 
market capitalization and the size of the public float for the 
security, while another considered the ability to sell short the 
security and the level of autocorrelation between the security’s 
prices.5 
From finance theory, the market for a security is said to 
be “semistrong form efficient” if the price of the security 
reflects all publicly available information.  Prices of securities 
reflect, albeit to varying extents, all publicly available 
information; therefore, markets for securities are semistrong 
form efficient in varying degrees.  Much research has also been 
done to determine the mechanisms by which the pricing signal 
operates, and it is widely understood that correction of 
mispricing of a stock primarily occurs through arbitrage 
activity.6 
Since arbitrage is not a cost-free activity, and because 
frictions remain, whether in the form of transaction costs, 
idiosyncratic risk, or other costs and risks associated with 
trading securities, pricing anomalies may persist.7  As a result, 
everything else remaining the same, financial economics tells 
us that the market for a stock with a higher arbitrage cost will 
be less efficient—i.e., a stock’s market efficiency is negatively 
related to its arbitrage risk.8  Thus, we refer to arbitrage risk 
 
 3. 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87. 
 4. See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 n.14 (3d Cir. 2011); 
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension, Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 
196, 204–05 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 508 
(1st Cir. 2005); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005); Gariety 
v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004); Binder v. Gillespie, 
184 F.3d 1059, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 5. See Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. Tex. 2001); In re 
Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F. 3d 1, 18 n. 21 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 6. See, e.g., LARRY HARRIS, TRADING & EXCHANGES: MARKET 
MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTICIONERS Ch. 10 & Ch. 17 (2003); Jeffrey Pontiff, 
Costly Arbitrage and the Myth of Idiosyncratic Risk, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 35 
(2006). 
 7. See, e.g., Jeffrey Pontiff, Costly arbitrage and the myth of idiosyncratic 
risk, J. ACCT. & ECON. (2006). 
 8. This implies that Market Efficiency Percentile – 1 = 100 – Arbitrage Risk 
Percentile.  For example, if a stock is at the 25th percentile for arbitrage risk, 
then the stock is at the 76th percentile for market efficiency. 
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as a negative proxy for market efficiency.  We discuss this in 
detail in Part II. 
Consider an arbitrageur whose information suggests that 
a stock is underpriced.  The arbitrageur will then “go long” on 
that stock (buy and hold the stock) in order to obtain arbitrage 
profits by selling the stock at a later date.  However, the 
arbitrageur will also manage the risk of holding the stock by 
hedging.  As a result of our interviews with traders “in the 
trenches,” we model the arbitrageur as choosing the optimal 
hedge stocks and the optimal hedge ratios.  The risk of this 
optimal arbitrage portfolio is the arbitrage risk of the stock, 
our negative proxy for market efficiency.  We discuss these 
calculations in detail. 
We provide a methodology that can calculate the market 
efficiency percentile of a stock over the relevant period, based 
on the data for a comparable measurement period.9  For 
example, in Lefkoe, et al. v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., where 
the class period was January 5, 2006 to June 7, 2006, we used 
August 1, 2005 to January 4, 2006, as the measurement period. 
If it is not possible (or desirable) to use a different 
measurement period—e.g., if the period of interest 
immediately follows an initial public offering (IPO)—then we 
can do the calculations with the measurement period as the 
relevant period, and we call this the ex post arbitrage risk of 
the security for the relevant period.  For example, in a recent 
securities class action filed against Groupon, Inc., the class 
period was defined as November 4, 2011 to March 30, 2012.  
Since the class period immediately follows the IPO, we do not 
have trading data from a prior period to use as the 
measurement period. 
For this paper, we focus on ex ante (baseline) arbitrage 
risk, but we do sensitivity analyses with ex post arbitrage risk 
as another negative proxy for market efficiency.  We apply this 
methodology to calculate, on a yearly basis, the arbitrage risk 
for each U.S. exchange-listed common stock from 1988 to 2010 
(subject to certain restrictions).  We also perform a regression 
analysis of arbitrage risk (as a negative proxy of market 
efficiency) on the factors identified by courts in securities class 
actions.  These results are summarized in Table 1.10 
 
 9. We interpret comparability to mean a time interval that is proximate in 
location and length. 
 10. We detail all the variables in Section 4.  We use 5% as our level of 
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Relation 
with Market 
Efficiency 
Significance 
at 5% Level 
Consistency 
with 
“Conventional 
Wisdom” 
Factor    
Cammer v. 
Bloom    
Turnover Negative Significant Inconsistent 
Number of 
Analysts Negative Ambiguous — 
Number of 
Nasdaq 
Market 
Makers Negative Significant Inconsistent 
Unger v. 
Amidesys    
Market 
Capitalization Positive Significant Consistent 
Bid-Ask 
Spread Negative Significant Consistent 
Public Float 
Ratio Positive Ambiguous — 
Other    
Institutional 
Ownership 
Ratio Positive Significant Consistent 
Serial 
Correlation Positive Significant Inconsistent 
Explanatory 
Power Positive Significant — 
Inclusion in 
Dow Jones 
Index Negative Significant — 
 
We checked the sensitivity of these results through a 
number of additional analyses.  For one set, we replaced 
turnover with logarithm of volume (or logarithm of dollar 
 
significance.  If the significance results are different under homoscedasticity and 
under heteroscedasticity-robustness, we refer to the significance as ambiguous; 
Halbert White, A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and 
a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817 (1980). 
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volume) but removed market capitalization from the list of 
factors, reflecting the fact that, ceteris paribus, the volume for 
a stock with higher market capitalization will be higher.  For 
this set, we found that the results were the same as in Table 1, 
except that market efficiency was positively and significantly 
affected by number of analysts; positively but insignificantly 
affected by number of market makers (for Nasdaq stocks); 
positively but ambiguously affected by serial correlation; and 
positively and significantly affected by inclusion in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) (the latter makes sense 
because in this set, market capitalization is not used as an 
explanatory factor, whereas it was used as such for the results 
in Table 1). The second set uses only the Cammer factors as 
explanatory variables.  For this set, we found that the results 
were the same as in Table 1, except that market efficiency is 
positively but insignificantly affected by logarithm of volume 
(or logarithm of dollar volume); and positively and significantly 
affected by number of analysts. 
In Part I, we detail the development and application of 
market efficiency to securities class actions.  In Part II, we 
develop arbitrage risk as a negative proxy for market 
efficiency.  In Part III, we provide regression results that test 
the various factors believed to determine market efficiency—
we also investigate the empirical findings that are apparently 
inconsistent with “conventional wisdom” and show that the 
empirical findings are actually consistent with the principles 
of financial economics.  Part IV concludes the paper. 
I. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND SECURITIES CLASS 
ACTIONS 
General acceptance of the relevance of the efficient market 
hypothesis by the courts was confirmed with the case of Basic, 
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), in which the U.S. 
Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory.  But 
to understand the courts’ use of market efficiency, it is 
important first to understand what plaintiffs are required to 
prove in establishing a securities fraud claim. 
In a typical claim of securities fraud pursued under section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, pl aintiffs must 
prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by a 
defendant, (2) scienter, (3) a connection between the 
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, 
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(5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.11  To justify 
proceeding as a class action, instead of an individual’s claim, 
plaintiffs must also show that (1) the potential class of affected 
parties is so large that including them all individually is 
impractical, (2) questions of law or fact are common to all 
potential class members, (3) the claims of the named 
representative are typical of the potential class, and (4) the 
named representative can fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.12  Additionally, plaintiffs must establish 
at least one of the following: (1) that individual actions risk 
inconsistent rulings, yielding incompatible standards of 
conduct or risk impairing the rights of potential class members 
not a part of the lawsuit, or (2) final injunctive or declarative 
relief is appropriate, respecting the class as a whole, or (3) the 
questions of law or fact common to the potential class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members and that a class action is superior to other methods 
of adjudication.13  This last requirement, known as the 
predominance requirement, is frequently used to establish the 
additional Rule 23(b) standard for class actions. 
Until the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory in 
Basic, it was difficult for plaintiffs to establish the reliance 
element of their claim since they likely bought or sold the 
underlying security without direct knowledge of the alleged 
misrepresentation or omission.  It was even more challenging 
to establish that the evidence of reliance by all class members 
was common to each of them, that all class members relied on 
the same information and to the same degree in making their 
securities purchases or sales.  The fraud-on-the-market theory 
was designed to address plaintiffs’ difficulties in establishing 
reliance, with the added benefit that it provided a presumption 
of reliance applicable to all investors of the security in 
question. 
The fraud-on-the-market theory avoids the pitfall facing 
plaintiffs by providing them with a rebuttable presumption of 
reliance upon the alleged misrepresentations so long as the 
market for the underlying security is efficient.14  The notion is 
that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of 
 
 11. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 
1184, 1192 (2013). 
 12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
 14. In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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a security is determined by the publicly available information 
about the underlying company, including the alleged 
misrepresentation.15 
Assessment of market efficiency is generally first 
presented at the class certification stage of securities fraud 
cases, the point at which the court resolves whether the 
plaintiffs’ claims are best tried individually or whether 
numerous plaintiffs can collectively pursue essentially the 
same claim against the defendant at the same time.  At the 
class certification stage, plaintiffs can present evidence that 
they traded shares in an efficient market, and the court then 
presumes that investors who traded securities in that market 
relied on public, material misrepresentations regarding those 
securities.16  Defendants can rebut the presumption of reliance 
by presenting evidence challenging actual reliance or market 
efficiency.  Based on the evidence presented, the court then 
decides whether or not the matter can legitimately proceed as 
a class action. 
A class certification hearing is not a trial on the merits and 
is often conducted before full discovery is completed, so 
plaintiffs do not need to prove each of the claim elements on 
the merits at the class certification stage.  But plaintiffs are 
required to prove—not simply plead—the Rule 23(a) class 
action requirements and, most typically, that questions of law 
or fact common to all class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members.17  Over the years, 
tensions have grown, however, as the proof required to 
establish the class action requirements now frequently spills 
over into the merits of the underlying claims themselves.  The 
courts are thus struggling to determine what and how much 
information must be proven during class certification contests. 
Amid two recent and significant 5-4 decisions reversing 
class certification decisions because plaintiffs failed to prove 
the requirements of Rule 23, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 
564 U.S. ___ (2011) and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 
___ (2013), the United States Supreme Court has now issued 
three other significant decisions regarding securities class 
actions cases that ultimately continue to support the 1988 
 
 15. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2181 (2011) (quoting Basic Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988)). 
 16. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 
1184, 1192 (2013). 
 17. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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Basic decision even while demonstrating that the fraud-on-the-
market theory and the efficient market theory increasingly are 
coming under harsh attack. 
In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust 
Funds, 568 U.S. ___ (2013), a 6-3 majority decided that the 
materiality requirement of a securities claim was sufficiently 
distinct from market efficiency and the public nature of 
securities claims such that it did not have to be established at 
the class certification stage.  The Court reasoned that whether 
a misrepresentation was sufficiently material to a stock price 
was certainly a matter of common proof such that the courts do 
not need to delve into the merits of this issue during class 
certification.  The Court essentially held that, while the parties 
are presenting event studies that go to the reliance (and the 
predominance of the common reliance evidence) to show that a 
stock price effect exists, plaintiffs need not prove during class 
certification that the stock price effect was material.  Although 
certainly implicit in Scalia’s short dissenting opinion, neither 
his dissent nor the dissent of Thomas (joined by Scalia and 
Kennedy) explicitly suggested that the Basic decision should 
be overruled, presumably because that issue was not directly 
before the Court. 
Amgen is consistent with the Court’s unanimous decision 
two years earlier in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton 
Co., ___ U.S. ___ (2011), which held that plaintiffs need not 
prove loss causation, that the misrepresentation in question 
caused the plaintiffs’ economic loss, at the class certification 
stage.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously ruled 
in favor of Halliburton that plaintiffs’ proof of loss causation, 
that company statements “actually caused the stock price to 
fall and resulted in the losses,” was necessary to invoke the 
Basic presumption of reliance.18  Before the Supreme Court, 
Halliburton also suggested that insufficient evidence existed 
as to any price impact, thus suggesting there was nothing to 
rely upon in order to invoke the Basic presumption.19  The 
Supreme Court refused to examine the economic evidence and 
simply concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in conflating 
loss causation with the reliance element and the Basic 
 
 18. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011) 
(citations omitted). 
 19. Id. at 2186. 
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presumption of reliance.20  The Court remanded the matter for 
reconsideration of the trial court’s class certification decision. 
Subsequently, the district court granted class certification, 
which the Fifth Circuit affirmed.21  Halliburton then appealed 
to the Supreme Court and presented two issues.  First and 
foremost, the Court addressed whether the Basic presumption 
of liability should be overruled, and thus whether plaintiffs 
should be required to prove actual reliance, including whether 
class-wide, common proof of reliance was now required at the 
class certification stage of litigation.22  Second, the Court 
addressed the extent to which evidence of a presumption of 
reliance could be rebutted by defendants at the class 
certification stage, recognizing that class certification hearings 
are not supposed to be trials on the merits but also recognizing 
that the Court’s recent class action decisions place increasing 
burdens on plaintiffs to prove (as oppose to presume) the class 
action requirements of Rule 23.23 
The Supreme Court yet again unanimously vacated the 
lower court rulings and instructed the trial court to re-examine 
the evidence on class certification.24  Five justices, led by Chief 
Justice Roberts, determined that Halliburton should be given 
an opportunity to rebut the Basic presumption of reliance by 
presenting evidence of a lack of any price impact.25  Justices 
Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor concurred, recognizing that 
the evidentiary burden of rebutting the Basic presumption 
falls on defendants and thus should not be an additional hurdle 
for class action plaintiffs.26  Justices Thomas, Alito and Scalia 
concurred in the result but suggested that Basic should now be 
overruled, in part because “ ‘ overwhelming empirical evidence’ 
now suggests that even when markets do incorporate public 
information, they often fail to do so accurately” and that 
“ ‘ [s]cores’ of ‘efficiency-defying anomalies—such as market 
swings in the absence of new information and prolonged 
deviations from underlying asset values—make market 
 
 20. Id. 
 21. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 
2406 (2014). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 2407. 
 24. Id. at 2417. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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efficiency ‘more contestable than ever.’ ” 27 
Thus, the Basic presumption remains a fixture of federal 
securities litigation even though the judicial system is now 
amply aware of the debates within finance theory about the 
extent and usefulness of the efficient market hypothesis.  
Furthermore, the academic debates themselves will certainly 
carry over into future class certification analyses as 
Halliburton supports defendants’ efforts to garner evidence 
and present their own event studies challenging the efficiency 
of the information signals associated with plaintiffs’ 
allegations of misrepresentations. 
Without doubt, federal district courts will continue to 
conduct ever more rigorous reviews of market efficiency at the 
class certification stage of securities lawsuits.  The scope and 
structure of these analyses are necessarily case-by-case, left 
to the parties and their financial experts to present evidence 
to the courts, with the courts then making legal 
determinations about whether the pertinent markets were 
“efficient enough” to justify the Basic presumption of reliance. 
As such, we propose to use our methodology here to 
examine the market efficiency factors that parties have 
typically presented to the courts and upon which the courts 
have relied in making their determinations.  In addition to the 
Cammer factors referred to earlier, such factors include 
market capitalization, size of the public float, ability to sell 
short the security, and level of autocorrelation between the 
security’s prices.28  Our results will shed light on whether 
litigants and the courts are presenting evidence consistent 
with the results of finance theory and empirics. 
II. ARBITRAGE RISK AS A NEGATIVE PROXY FOR 
MARKET EFFICIENCY 
Capital market efficiency describes how completely and 
 
 27. Id. at 2421. 
 28. See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623 (3d Cir. 2011), abrogated in 
part by Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); 
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 
196, 204 n.11 (2d Cir. 2008); In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 508–09 
(1st Cir. 2005); In re Polymedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 18 n.21 (1st Cir. 
2005); Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005); Gariety v. Grant 
Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004); Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F. 3d 
1059, 1064–65 (9th Cir. 1999); Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 478 (N.D. 
Tex. 2001). 
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accurately the pricing signal works.  When all publicly 
available information is reflected in a security’s price, the 
market for the security is said to be semistrong form efficient.29  
We interpret the concept not as an either/or, binary construct, 
but rather as a relative concept occurring along a continuum, 
and thus one often refers to a market’s relative efficiency.30  
The pricing signal is thought to work through the actions of all 
traders who, whatever their level of knowledge and 
sophistication, convey their individual valuations to the 
market through their buy and sell decisions at various price 
points.31  The collective actions of all traders thus push the 
price of a particular security toward its market equilibrium 
level, but do not necessarily take the market for the security 
all the way to perfect semistrong form efficiency. 
Arbitrageurs are investors who trade on information about 
relative values.  They trade investments that are or should be 
fundamentally correlated but for which they believe the 
market valuations are deviating from the fundamental 
relation.  Thus arbitrageurs attempt to take advantage of the 
market pricing discrepancies between otherwise 
fundamentally correlated securities in order to earn trading 
profits.  This activity of exploiting situations in which markets 
are not efficient assists the pricing signal by conveying 
information to the market and helping to push the market to 
efficiency, but does not necessarily take the market all the way 
to perfect semistrong form efficiency. 
But as Pontiff explains, because of “costly arbitrage,” 
arbitrageurs are unlikely to ever completely eliminate 
mispricing.32  He identifies two sources of arbitrage costs: 
transactions costs (e.g., commissions, brokerage fees) and 
holding costs (e.g., opportunity cost of capital and the 
idiosyncratic risk of a security), and he stresses the importance 
of idiosyncratic risk in making arbitrage a costly endeavor.33  
As arbitrageurs construct their hedge portfolios of 
 
 29. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383, 404 (1970); BURTON G. MALKIEL, Efficient 
Market Hypothesis, in NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND FINANCE 322–
36 (P. Newman, M. Milgate, & J. Eatwell eds., 1st ed. 1987). 
 30. See, e.g., John Campbell, Andrew Lo, and A. Craig MacKinlay, The 
Econometrics of Financial Markets, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ 
(1997). 
 31. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 6, at chapters 10 and 17. 
 32. Pontiff, supra note 7, at 39–40. 
 33. Id. at 37, 41. 
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investments, supposedly correlated in returns, they cannot 
find perfectly positive correlations in returns and thus perfect 
substitutes as investments (or perfectly negative correlations 
in returns and perfect complements as investments), so they 
are always exposed to the vagaries of each individual security 
they hold.  Even aggregated across a number of investment 
positions within the hedge portfolio, the legs of the arbitrage, 
arbitrageurs cannot eliminate the idiosyncratic risk of any 
security. 
As a result of the costs of arbitrage, including idiosyncratic 
risk, market inefficiencies will always remain; the better 
arbitrage works, the more efficient the market for a security is 
likely to be.  As a result, the costs of arbitrage for a security 
provide a means to test the efficiency of the security. 
Pontiff concludes that “idiosyncratic risk is the single 
largest cost faced by arbitrageurs,” and that “idiosyncratic risk 
is the single largest barrier to arbitrage.”34  Our notion of 
arbitrage risk is a generalization of the standard notion of 
idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of 
residuals from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).35  If 
an arbitrageur is constrained to having access to only the 
market index and a risk-free instrument to devise an optimal 
zero-net-investment arbitrage portfolio, then the risk of the 
resulting optimal arbitrage portfolio is the standard 
idiosyncratic risk.  For our notion of ex ante or ex post arbitrage 
risk, however, we model the arbitrageur as optimally choosing 
the components of the arbitrage portfolio from the universe of 
the market index and all exchange-listed U.S. common stocks, 
based on financial data on the returns of the stock of interest, 
all candidate securities, and the risk-free instrument over the 
measurement period.  Then, given the optimal choice of the 
components of the arbitrage portfolio, and the risk-free 
instrument, we model the arbitrageur as choosing the optimal 
hedge ratios under a zero-net-investment constraint.  The risk 
of this optimal arbitrage portfolio is the arbitrage risk of the 
stock, our negative proxy for market efficiency.  Our interviews 
with traders “in the trenches” confirm this overall structure of 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market 
Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FINANCE 425 (1964); Harry 
Markowitz, The Early History of Portfolio Theory: 1600–1960, 55 FIN.  ANALYSTS 
J. 5 (1999); Merton H. Miller, The History of Finance, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., 95 
(1999). 
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hedging behavior by arbitrageurs.  Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 
construct a similar notion of arbitrage risk, but their substitute 
securities are selected from similarities in product market 
characteristics.36 
We thus develop a practical and general (negative) proxy 
for market efficiency by quantifying the arbitrage risk 
associated with each individual security.  This simple 
(negative) proxy for market efficiency then allows for an 
examination of a variety of factors that have been proffered by 
economists and lawyers as affecting market efficiency. 
We calculate the arbitrage risk of a stock over a defined 
relevant period as follows: 
We select the relevant period, which can be a day, a week, 
a court-determined “class” period, or other time frame of 
relevance (simply for presentation in this paper, we have 
chosen annual periods). 
We choose a period immediately prior to the relevant 
period as the measurement period, because the arbitrageur 
would not have had access to relevant-period data at the 
beginning of the relevant period (also for simplicity, we have 
chosen the year prior to the relevant period as the 
measurement period). 
On the basis of the measurement period, we determine the 
lowest risk portfolio that an arbitrageur would use to benefit 
from mispricing, as explained above.  We call this portfolio the 
arbitrage portfolio for the stock. 
The ex ante (or baseline) arbitrage risk of the security for 
the relevant period is the risk of the arbitrage portfolio over 
the relevant period. 
If it is not possible (or desirable) to use a different 
measurement period—e.g., if the period of interest 
immediately follows an initial public offering—then we can do 
the calculations where the measurement period is the same as 
the relevant period, and we call this the ex post arbitrage risk 
of the security for the relevant period.  For this paper, we focus 
on ex ante (baseline) arbitrage risk, but we do sensitivity 
analyses with ex post arbitrage risk as another negative proxy 
for market efficiency. 
Consider a stock that is underpriced (overpriced) 
according to the information available to an arbitrageur.  In 
 
 36. Jeffrey Wurgler and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Does Arbitrage Flatten 
Demand Curves for Stocks, 75 J. BUS. 583, 592–93 (2002). 
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order to exploit this profitable opportunity, the arbitrageur will 
construct the following arbitrage portfolio with zero net 
investment, thereby reaping arbitrage profits when closing out 
the investment portfolio: 
Arbitrage numerator: go long (short) on the mispriced 
stock; let’s say by $1 (purely a normalization). 
Other arbitrage legs: 
Go short (long) on N other securities.  We use N = 5 legs 
for the baseline model, but the results do not change 
qualitatively with values of N = 10 or 20. 
Go short (long) on the risk-free asset. 
The total amount on these legs has to add up to $1 short 
(long). 
How much to go short (long) on each leg is called the 
corresponding Hedge Ratio.37 
The risk of a portfolio over a period is defined as the 
standard deviation of daily returns of the portfolio over that 
period.  Since the arbitrageur does not have access to all 
relevant period data at the beginning of the relevant period, 
we choose a period immediately prior to the relevant period as 
the measurement period, and the arbitrage portfolio is selected 
to minimize the risk (i.e., the standard deviation of daily 
returns) of the arbitrage portfolio38 over the measurement 
period, with the requirement described above that the 
arbitrage portfolio require zero investment.  The risk of the 
arbitrage portfolio over the relevant period is the arbitrage risk 
of the stock for the relevant period.  For this paper: 
We measure arbitrage risk for U.S. exchange-listed 
common stocks, 
We consider only U.S. exchange-listed common stocks, and 
the S&P 500 index, as candidate legs of the hedge portfolio, 
and 
We use daily returns on six-month U.S. Treasury bills as 
the daily risk-free rate.39 
Table 2 shows examples of exchange-listed stocks and 
their estimated market efficiency percentiles in 2010, on the 
 
 37. Id. at 593 (providing the computational simplification used here). 
 38. “Arbitrageurs generally construct hedge portfolios to minimize the total 
risk of the portfolio.”  HARRIS, supra note 6, at 348. 
 39. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Selected Interest Rates 
(Daily), FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE H.15, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm (last updated Feb. 18, 
2015). 
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basis of our measure of arbitrage risks of all U.S. exchange-
listed common stocks. 
 
Table 2: Examples of Market Efficiency Percentiles in 2010 
Ticker Company 
Market 
Efficiency 
Percentile 
ADP AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING INC 100 
BRK BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC DEL 100 
DUK DUKE ENERGY CORP NEW 100 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 100 
HNZ HEINZ H J CO 100 
JNJ JOHNSON & JOHNSON 100 
JW WILEY JOHN & SONS INC 100 
MO ALTRIA GROUP INC 100 
NST NSTAR 100 
ADM ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO 91 
CAT CATERPILLAR INC 91 
CSCO CISCO SYSTEMS INC 91 
EMC E M C CORP MA 91 
BLK BLACKROCK INC 81 
CBT CABOT CORP 81 
ENDP 
ENDO PHARMACEUTICALS HLDNGS 
INC 81 
GPS GAP INC 81 
AMZN AMAZON COM INC 80 
AXP AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 80 
ACF AMERICREDIT CORP 51 
CIEN CIENA CORP 51 
COBZ COBIZ FINANCIAL INC 51 
CPHD CEPHEID 51 
DAL DELTA AIR LINES INC 51 
ACAT ARCTIC CAT INC 26 
APKT ACME PACKET INC 26 
ARTW ARTS WAY MANUFACTURING INC 26 
ATAC A T C TECHNOLOGY CORP 26 
AVII A V I BIOPHARMA INC 26 
TEAR OCCULOGIX INC 1 
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TLX TRANS LUX CORP 1 
TSTR TERRESTAR CORP 1 
VNDA VANDA PHARMACEUTICALS INC 1 
ZANE ZANETT INC 1 
 
Table 3 demonstrates that different stocks display 
different patterns of market efficiency across time. 
 
Table 3: Examples of Market Efficiency Percentiles Over 
Time 
Ticke
r Company Name Year 
Market 
Efficienc
y 
Percentil
e 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2001 96 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2002 83 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2003 95 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2004 68 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2005 46 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2006 54 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2007 60 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2008 68 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2009 47 
ALG ALAMO GROUP INC 2010 58 
    
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2001 2 
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2002 3 
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2003 3 
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2004 1 
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2005 2 
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2006 1 
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2007 1 
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2008 1 
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2009 3 
CNLG CONOLOG CORP 2010 2 
    
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2001 100 
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ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2002 98 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2003 100 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2004 100 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2005 100 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2006 100 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2007 100 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2008 100 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2009 100 
ED CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 2010 100 
    
FRE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP 2001 100 
FRE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP 2002 100 
FRE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP 2003 91 
FRE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP 2004 97 
FRE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP 2005 94 
FRE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP 2006 95 
FRE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP 2007 40 
FRE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP 2008 3 
FRE 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 
CORP 2009 3 
    
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2001 55 
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2002 89 
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2003 92 
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2004 96 
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2005 98 
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2006 87 
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2007 95 
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2008 95 
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2009 89 
MSFT MICROSOFT CORP 2010 95 
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III. RELATION OF ARBITRAGE RISK TO STANDARD 
FACTORS: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
We test the empirical relation with arbitrage risk (as a 
negative proxy for market efficiency) of factors relied upon by 
courts and others as determinants of market efficiency.40  This 
is done for all U.S. exchange-listed common stocks from 1988 
(the year of the landmark Basic decision detailed in Part I) to 
2010, the last year for which we have full data, with the 
following restrictions. 
We restricted attention to stock-year combinations 
consisting of stocks that had one PERMNO, one ticker, and one 
CUSIP over the year in the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) Daily Stock Database.  We utilized each stock 
available from CRSP,41 for which the following data exist for at 
least 75% of trading days during each of the relevant and 
measurement periods: 
• Returns 
• Shares outstanding 
• Trading volume 
• Closing bid 
• Closing ask 
• Exchange membership 
• Number of market makers. 
To include a particular stock in our analysis, we also 
required data to be available for: 
• The number of securities analysts (from I/B/E/S) 
• Insider holdings (from Thomson Reuters) 
• Institutional holdings (from Thomson Reuters) 
• Inclusion in (or exclusion from) the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) index (from Phyllis 
Pierce, The Dow Jones Averages 1885–1995). 
Appendix 1 shows the number of stocks at the various 
stages after imposing the restrictions described above. 
From this data, we develop measures for the various 
 
 40. See generally Brad Barber, Paul A. Griffin & Baruch Lev, The Fraud-on-
the-Market Theory and the Indicators of Common Stocks’ Efficiency, J. CORP. L. 
285 (1994) (using a different proxy). 
 41. shrcd = 10 or 11 in the Daily Stock Database from the Center for Research 
in Security Prices. 
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factors that courts and others have relied upon as influencing 
market efficiency.  These measures are each defined below. 
• Turnover: mean daily turnover (volume)/(shares 
outstanding) over the relevant period. 
• Number of security analysts: number of security 
analysts who announced at least one projection 
about the security during the relevant period. 
• Number of market makers for Nasdaq stocks: 
highest, over the relevant period, of the number of 
market makers on each day. 
• Market capitalization: mean of daily logarithm of 
market capitalization over the relevant year. 
• Bid-ask spread: mean of daily relative spread 
(closing ask − closing bid)/(closing price) over the 
relevant period. 
• Public float ratio: mean of quarterly public float 
ratio (shares outstanding − insider holdings)/
(shares outstanding) over the relevant period. 
• Institutional ownership ratio: institutional 
ownership ratio (institutional holdings)/(shares 
outstanding) over the relevant period. 
• Serial correlation in CAPM: By performing the 
Durbin-Watson Test on the CAPM on daily returns 
for a stock for a calendar year, we obtain the p-
value for positive serial correlation and the p-value 
for negative serial correlation.42  The negative of 
the minimum of these p-values is a positive 
measure of serial correlation in the CAPM for the 
particular stock for the relevant year. 
• Explanatory power of CAPM: R2 of the CAPM for 
the security in the relevant period. 
• Inclusion in the DJIA: If a stock is on the DJIA for 
an entire year, the indicator variable for that stock 
for that year is one.  If a stock is not on the DJIA 
for an entire year, the indicator variable for that 
stock for that year is zero.  If a stock is on the DJIA 
for only part of the year, the observation for that 
stock for that year is deleted from the regression. 
Summary statistics for arbitrage risk and for each of the 
explanatory variables are shown in Appendix 2. 
For this paper, we perform a reduced-form regression of 
 
 42. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2000). 
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arbitrage risk43 on various factors of market efficiency, 
controlling for year.  The results of this regression—which uses 
35,587 observations (stock-years) and has R2 = 0.463 and 
adjusted R2 = 0.462 (see Appendix 3)—are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Detailed Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: 
Arbitrage Risk   
  Under Homoscedasticity Heteroscedasticity-Robust 
Factor Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-
Statistic p-Value 
Standard 
Error 
t-
Statistic 
p-
Value 
Cammer v. 
Bloom        
Turnover 74.366%   3.881%   19.160   <0.0001 6.286%   11.830   <0.0001 
Number of 
Analysts 0.006%   0.004%   1.770   0.077 0.002%   3.100   0.0019 
Number of 
Nasdaq 
Market 
Makers 0.019%   0.003%   5.780   <0.0001 0.004%   4.880   <0.0001 
Unger v. 
Amidesys        
Market 
Capitalization -0.406%   0.032%   -12.880   <0.0001 0.043%   -9.360   <0.0001 
Bid-Ask 
Spread 48.975%   1.750%   27.980   <0.0001 9.077%   5.400   <0.0001 
Public Float 
Ratio -0.821%   0.179%   -4.600   <0.0001 0.880%   -0.930   0.3508 
Other        
Institutional 
Ownership 
Ratio -0.629%   0.138%   -4.560   <0.0001 0.142%   -4.420   <0.0001 
Serial 
Correlation -0.423%   0.195%   -2.170   0.03 0.148%   -2.860   0.0042 
Explanatory 
Power -1.411%   0.280%   -5.040   <0.0001 0.166%   -8.520   <0.0001 
Inclusion in 
Dow Jones 
Index 1.030%   0.295%   3.490   0.0005 0.136%   7.550   <0.0001 
 
 43. It is worth noting again that, ceteris paribus, market efficiency has a 
negative relation with arbitrage risk. 
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Listed on 
NYSE 0.467%   0.145%   3.220   0.0013 0.153%   3.040   0.0024 
Listed on 
AMEX -0.351%   0.163%   -2.150   0.0314 0.112%   -3.150   0.0016 
Listed on 
Other 
Exchange 0.800%   2.255%   0.350   0.7227 0.640%   1.250   0.2113 
Year 1988 6.788%   0.571%   11.890   <0.0001 0.878%   7.730   <0.0001 
Year 1989 7.640%   0.550%   13.900   <0.0001 0.872%   8.760   <0.0001 
Year 1990 12.130%   0.563%   21.550   <0.0001 1.267%   9.570   <0.0001 
Year 1991 45.566%   0.568%   80.230   <0.0001 4.618%   9.870   <0.0001 
Year 1992 11.421%   0.464%   24.610   <0.0001 0.976%   11.700   <0.0001 
Year 1993 6.968%   0.457%   15.240   <0.0001 0.850%   8.190   <0.0001 
Year 1994 6.826%   0.449%   15.210   <0.0001 0.852%   8.010   <0.0001 
Year 1995 6.743%   0.447%   15.070   <0.0001 0.853%   7.910   <0.0001 
Year 1996 7.066%   0.444%   15.920   <0.0001 0.856%   8.260   <0.0001 
Year 1997 7.381%   0.439%   16.830   <0.0001 0.852%   8.670   <0.0001 
Year 1998 7.968%   0.433%   18.420   <0.0001 0.848%   9.400   <0.0001 
Year 1999 7.966%   0.437%   18.210   <0.0001 0.856%   9.300   <0.0001 
Year 2000 8.747%   0.436%   20.070   <0.0001 0.859%   10.180   <0.0001 
Year 2001 8.742%   0.424%   20.610   <0.0001 0.840%   10.400   <0.0001 
Year 2002 8.539%   0.414%   20.620   <0.0001 0.830%   10.290   <0.0001 
Year 2003 7.963%   0.412%   19.330   <0.0001 0.819%   9.730   <0.0001 
Year 2004 7.801%   0.417%   18.730   <0.0001 0.823%   9.480   <0.0001 
Year 2005 7.694%   0.416%   18.480   <0.0001 0.823%   9.340   <0.0001 
Year 2006 7.684%   0.415%   18.510   <0.0001 0.824%   9.320   <0.0001 
Year 2007 8.080%   0.411%   19.650   <0.0001 0.825%   9.800   <0.0001 
Year 2008 9.465%   0.399%   23.710   <0.0001 0.828%   11.430   <0.0001 
Year 2009 9.677%   0.393%   24.630   <0.0001 0.823%   11.760   <0.0001 
Year 2010 7.928%   0.396%   20.010   <0.0001 0.820%   9.670   <0.0001 
 
As with the results summarized in Table 1, we checked the 
sensitivity of these results through a number of additional 
analyses.  For one set, we replaced turnover with logarithm of 
volume (or logarithm of dollar volume) but removed market 
capitalization from the list of factors, reflecting the fact that, 
ceteris paribus, the volume for a stock with higher market 
capitalization will be higher.  For this set, we found that the 
results were the same as in Table 4, except that arbitrage risk 
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was negatively and significantly affected by number of 
analysts; negatively but insignificantly affected by number of 
market makers (for Nasdaq stocks); negatively but 
ambiguously affected by serial correlation; and negatively and 
significantly affected by inclusion in the DJIA (the latter 
makes sense because in this set, market capitalization is not 
used as an explanatory factor, whereas it was used as such for 
the results in Table 4). The second set uses only the Cammer 
factors as explanatory variables.  For this set, we found that 
the results were the same as in Table 4, except that arbitrage 
risk is negatively but insignificantly affected by logarithm of 
volume (or logarithm of dollar volume); and negatively and 
significantly affected by number of analysts. 
A. Trading Volume 
The positive relation of trading volume or turnover with 
market efficiency is often considered almost axiomatic—
statements such as “the more thinly traded the stock, the less 
efficient the market is” are common.  However, this is not 
necessarily the case.44  In order to appreciate how trading 
volume (or turnover) is often misunderstood, we need to 
appreciate that: 
[I]nvestors trade among themselves because they are 
different. . . . The difference in their response to the same 
information generates trading.  The greater the 
information asymmetry, the larger the abnormal trading 
volume when public news arrives.45 
We would observe higher trading volume or turnover in 
the market for an asset if and only if:46 
1) Transaction costs (including bid-ask spread, 
commissions, and search costs) are low relative to 
 
 44. See also MAUREEN O’HARA, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE THEORY (2nd ed. 
1997); Lawrence Blume, David Easley & Maureen O’Hara, Market Statistics and 
Technical Analysis: The Role of Volume, 49 J. FIN. 153 (1994); Jonathan Karpoff, 
The Relation Between Price Changes and Trading Volume: A Survey, 22 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 109 (1987); Erik R. Sirri, Edith S. Hotchkiss & Michael 
A. Goldstein, Transparency and Liquidity: A Controlled Experiment on Corporate 
Bonds, 20 REV. FIN. STUDIES 235 (2007); and Scott E. Stickel & Robert E. 
Verrecchia, Evidence that Trading Volume Sustains Stock Price Changes, 50 FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 57 (1994). 
 45. Jiang Wang, A Model of Competitive Stock Trading Volume, 102 J. POL. 
ECON. 127, 128–29 (1994). 
 46. See Rajeev Bhattacharya, Structural Models of Market Efficiency, MIMEO 
(2012), for detailed derivations. 
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dispersion in investor valuations. 
2) Low-valuers hold more securities than high-
valuers, and short sales costs are low relative to 
dispersion in investor valuations. 
Higher trading volume will therefore be observed with: 
• Lower transaction costs, 
• Lower short sales costs, 
• Higher dispersion of investor valuations, and/or 
• Higher likelihood that an investor holds the asset. 
Clearly, market efficiency would be facilitated by lower 
transaction costs and lower short sales costs—and when a 
claim is made about higher trading volume being a factor 
favoring market efficiency, it is often implicitly based on this 
argument.  However, there is no reason to conclude that, 
ceteris paribus, a higher dispersion in investor valuations, or a 
higher likelihood that an investor holds the asset, would lead 
to higher market efficiency.47 
Given these contrary dependencies, the relation of market 
efficiency with turnover is fundamentally an empirical 
question, and our empirical finding, for all U.S. exchange-
listed common stocks from 1988 to 2010,48 is that turnover 
negatively and significantly affects market efficiency. 
B. The Number of Market Makers 
From the above discussion, we can see that the demand for 
market making services in a Nasdaq stock is an increasing 
function of dispersion in investor valuations—i.e., everything 
else remaining the same, a firm is more likely to be a market 
maker in a Nasdaq stock if the investor valuation profile for 
that stock is more dispersed, because there would be more 
trades to enable more profits. 
However, the higher the number of market makers, the 
higher the competition for trades would be, and this would 
reduce the transaction costs of trades.  Therefore, a higher 
number of market makers would be observed with higher 
dispersion (not unambiguously facilitating market efficiency, 
as shown above) and/or lower transaction cost (facilitating 
market efficiency). 
 
 47. With high dispersion in investor valuations, we can have a high trading 
volume (much of which can be due to noise trading), and a higher dispersion in 
investor valuations does not necessarily add to the efficiency of a market. 
 48. Restrictions are detailed at the beginning of Section 3. 
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Therefore, as above, the relation between the number of 
Nasdaq market makers and market efficiency is 
fundamentally empirical, and our empirical finding, for all 
U.S. exchange-listed common stocks from 1988 to 2010,49 is 
that arbitrage risk for a Nasdaq stock is positively and 
significantly related to the number of market makers for that 
stock; and that market efficiency for a Nasdaq stock is 
negatively and significantly related to the number of market 
makers for that stock. 
C. Serial Correlation 
Serial correlation in the CAPM of a stock’s daily returns, 
suggesting a day-to-day pattern of repeated performance, and 
is often considered evidence of market inefficiencies.  Some 
scholars have suggested other explanations50 of serial 
correlation that are consistent with market efficiency.  In the 
presence of such inconsistent findings, this dependence 
becomes an empirical question.  Our empirical findings suggest 
that, on the basis of all U.S. exchange-listed common stocks 
from 1988 to 2010,51 serial correlation affects market efficiency 
positively and significantly. 
D. Other Factors 
The number of securities analysts is a Cammer factor, and 
other courts have suggested using public float as a factor 
favorable to a finding of market efficiency.  Our empirical 
findings suggest that, on the basis of all U.S. exchange-listed 
common stocks from 1988 to 2010,52 the number of securities 
analysts and public float have an ambiguous impact on market 
efficiency. 
Consistent with the position taken by courts and others, 
we find that market capitalization and institutional ownership 
have significant empirical support based on our analysis.  The 
bid-ask spread of a stock, which is a measure of transaction 
cost of a stock, has been used by courts as a factor inhibiting 
market efficiency, and our results confirm this position, too. 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Ray Ball & S.P. Kothari, Nonstationary Expected Returns: Implications 
for Tests of Market Efficiency and Serial Correlation in Returns, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 
51 (1989). 
 51. Restrictions are detailed at the beginning of Section 3. 
 52. Id. 
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Although we have not found a court ruling where the 
inclusion of the relevant stock in a major index is a factor 
favorable to a finding of market efficiency, expert reports and 
testimony commonly use such an argument.  It is interesting 
to note, however, that because we control for market 
capitalization, what the indicator variable corresponding to 
membership in the DJIA measures is purely how much the 
inclusion of the stock in the DJIA adds to the efficiency of the 
market for the stock, over and above what the stock’s market 
capitalization predicts.  We find, for all U.S. exchange-listed 
common stocks from 1988 to 2010,53 that inclusion in the DJIA, 
over and above its size, significantly reduces the efficiency of 
the market for its stock. 
It should be noted that these results are robust to 
alterations in the statistical model.  We performed sensitivity 
analyses with a) ex post arbitrage risk, b) sign constraints on 
the correlations of returns in the determination of legs of the 
arbitrage portfolio, c) sign constraints on the hedge ratios, d) 
number of legs in the arbitrage portfolio, and e) the risk-free 
rate. The empirical findings are qualitatively the same as for 
the baseline regressions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We discuss arbitrage risk, a negative proxy for market 
efficiency based on financial economics, and show how it can 
be applied to securities class actions. 
We also test the dependence of arbitrage risk on various 
standard factors used by courts in the determination of market 
efficiency.  Some of these empirical findings do not seem 
consistent with “conventional wisdom”—as Warren Buffett is 
famously supposed to have said, “Well, it may be all right in 
practice, but it will never work in theory.”  However, we 
suggest that our empirical findings are actually consistent 
with economic theory. 
The list of determinants of market efficiency considered in 
this paper is not exhaustive.  Academic research and 
interviews with financial practitioners have suggested 
additional factors such as external and internal regulations, 
and industrial organization (including supply and demand 
structures) of product markets.  We intend to utilize data on 
 
 53. Id. 
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industry codes, and industry properties such as pricing and 
concentration, to analyze these additional factors affecting 
market efficiency. 
Cammer Factor (5)—the cause-and-effect relationship 
between material disclosures and changes in the security’s 
price—is typically analyzed using event studies, which are 
joint tests of market efficiency and significance of particular 
events.54  Using summaries of such event studies as proxies for 
market efficiency in the context of a macro-analysis like ours 
would be possible only with substantial simplifications/
assumptions such as restricting our attention to earnings 
announcements different from consensus analyst forecasts as 
the only surprises for a stock.  We intend to undertake such an 
analysis in the future. 
Finally, we propose to investigate alternative proxies for 
market efficiency such as put-call parity of options on the 
security of interest in order to test the robustness of our results 
across varying measures of market efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 54. See, e.g., CAMPBELL, ET AL., supra note 30; and Pontiff, supra note 7, at 
35. 
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Appendix 1: Number of Unique Stock-Year Combinations 
Year All 
With Unique 
PERMNO, Ticker, 
and CUSIP in 
Calendar Year 
With 
Calendar 
Year 
Trading 
Restrictions 
After 
Mergers 
with 
Other 
Data 
     
     
All 
Years 141,591 131,779 106,585 37,111 
     
1988 5,323 4,839 4,040 538 
1989 4,980 4,633 4,053 578 
1990 4,772 4,454 3,923 585 
1991 4,843 4,523 3,901 610 
1992 6,434 5,973 4,669 652 
1993 6,976 6,450 4,911 754 
1994 7,367 6,871 5,160 866 
1995 7,757 7,170 5,507 990 
1996 8,282 7,606 5,605 1,098 
1997 8,468 7,710 5,781 1,237 
1998 8,254 7,544 5,869 1,415 
1999 7,917 7,218 5,551 1,542 
2000 7,528 6,835 5,198 1,646 
2001 6,692 6,252 5,016 1,765 
2002 5,955 5,562 4,850 1,917 
2003 5,497 5,231 4,535 2,034 
2004 5,286 5,032 4,314 2,185 
2005 5,228 4,976 4,162 2,379 
2006 5,179 4,893 4,085 2,619 
2007 5,155 4,891 3,993 2,859 
2008 4,843 4,591 3,923 2,900 
2009 4,533 4,343 3,871 3,040 
2010 4,322 4,182 3,668 2,902 
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Appendix 3: Summary Regression Results 
Number of Observations Read  37,111    
Number of Observations Used  35,587    
Number of Observations with 
Missing Values    1,524    
      
Source 
Degrees 
of 
Freedom 
Sum of 
Squares 
(SS) Mean SS 
F-
Statistic 
p-
Value 
       
Model 36  93.1478 2.58744 851.3 
<0.00
01 
Error 35,551  108.0536 0.00304   
Uncorrected 
Total 35,587  201.2014    
      
      
R2 0.463      
Adjusted R2 0.462      
 
